Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis by Cherry, Todd et al.
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
 
Cherry, Todd and David McEvoy. (2013). Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the 
Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis. Environmental and Resource Economics 54(1): 
63-77. Published by Springer www.springer.com (ISSN: 0924-6460) DOI 10.1007/s10640-012-9581-3 
 
 
 
Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the 
Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis 
 
 
Todd L. Cherry & David M. McEvoy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance of a deposit-refund 
mechanism used to enforce compliance with voluntary public-good commitments made 
in the absence of strong regulatory institutions. With this mechanism agents decide 
whether to join an agreement and pay a deposit prior to making their contribution 
decisions. If an agreement receives sufficient membership to form, members then make 
their contribution decisions and compliant members are refunded their deposits. If an 
agreement does not form, then deposits are immediately refunded and a standard 
voluntary contribution game is played. We find that the deposit-refund mechanism 
achieves nearly full efficiency when agreements require full participation, but is far less 
effective, and in some cases disruptive, when agreements require only partial 
participation. As the mechanism does not require the existence of strong sanctioning 
institutions, it is particularly suited for enforcing compliance with international 
environmental agreements. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The management of many environmental and natural resources gives rise to social 
dilemma situations in which individually rational decisions are not collectively rational. 
Public goods (e.g., protection of ozone layer, preservation of biological diversity) tend to 
be underprovided and common-pool-resources (e.g., fisheries, forest resources) tend to 
be overexploited. Many social dilemma situations may be easily resolved given the 
existence of strong regulatory institutions. For example, a well-functioning government 
could provide efficient levels of public goods if it can adequately collect taxes and use 
the revenue to produce public goods (e.g., public transportation). Likewise, common-
pool resources may be managed efficiently given an effective regulatory institution and 
credible enforcement provisions (e.g., federal regulation of commercial fisheries). In 
many cases, however, these types of social dilemmas exist in the absence of strong 
regulatory institutions. The problem of managing greenhouse-gas emissions, or 
transboundary environmental problems in general (e.g., managing CFC emissions, 
trade in endangered species, biodiversity preservation), falls into this category. 
Sovereignty requires that transboundary environmental public goods are provided in a 
decentralized fashion without an overarching global government that can heavy 
handedly regulate the management of shared resources. 
 
In the absence of traditional regulatory approaches, transboundary resources are 
typically managed through voluntary institutions called international environmental 
agreements (IEAs). While there are many obstacles in enacting effective IEAs, there are 
two potentially formidable challenges. First, participation with IEAs is voluntary, meaning 
nations are free to decide whether to join an agreement. This presents a challenge 
because commitments made under an agreement, by definition, restrict a member’s use 
of a shared environmental or natural resource, and there are often strong incentives to 
free ride. The second challenge is that compliance with the terms of an agreement 
needs to be enforced. Provisions for enforcement must be included as part of the 
agreement and cannot depend on the presence of a strong regulatory body. 
Furthermore, the enforcement provisions need to be effective in the sense that they will 
be severe enough to deter noncompliance and credible in the sense that they will 
actually be imposed. While a great deal of research has addressed the first challenge 
posed—the one of voluntary participation—less attention has been paid to the fact that 
compliance with voluntary agreements needs to be enforced. In this paper we address 
the issue of enforcing compliance with IEAs by examining one promising instrument that 
exhibits the necessary features for effective enforcement. The instrument explored 
here—a deposit-refund mechanism—has recently been proposed in the theoretical 
literature (Gerber and Wichardt 2009) and the reported results are encouraging. 
Building on their study, we empirically test the theoretical predictions of alternative 
deposit-refund schemes using experimental methods. 
 
While some research does address the compliance issue directly (e.g., Barrett 1994, 
1997, 2008; Finus and Rundshagen 1998; Barrett and Stavins 2003; Hovi et al. 2007; 
Finus 2008; McEvoy and Stranlund 2009;McEvoy et al. 2011)much of the economics 
literature avoids the problem of maintaining compliance by designing models, and 
experiments, in which agreement members are required to comply with their 
commitments (e.g., Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1998; Hoel and Schneider 
1997; Rubio and Ulph 2006, 2007; Kolstad 2007; McGinty 2007; Carraro et al. 
2009;Kosfeld et al. 2009; Breton et al. 2010; Dannenberg et al. 2010; McEvoy 2010).2,3 
In other words, these studies do not give agreement members the opportunity to violate 
the treaty. This is not a trivial issue. Ignoring the possibility of noncompliance abstracts 
from a fundamental problem for the effectiveness of cooperative agreements; that is, 
the opportunity to violate commitments could have significant impacts on the 
management of shared resources. In fact, many attribute the impending failure of the 
Kyoto Protocol to the lack of credible enforcement of compliance. Barrett (2003, p. 360) 
argues, “…if the negotiators had reflected on the need for enforcement and on the 
difficulty of devising an effective enforcement mechanism earlier in the process, they 
may have negotiated a different kind of treaty—one that sustained more cooperation.” 
 
Motivated by the need to explore enforcement strategies within environmental 
agreements in the absence of strong institutions, we adapt the general model of Gerber 
and Wichardt (2009) and utilize a set of laboratory experiments to test the effectiveness 
of different deposit-refund schemes. While the theoretical approach is useful for 
predicting how the deposit-refund system can facilitate cooperation, an experimental 
approach allows for its empirical test in the absence of naturally occurring data.5 While 
deposit-refund mechanisms are used in a number of simple settings (e.g., return of 
recyclable solidwaste, environmental performance bonds, etc.), we analyze a deposit-
refund game within an agreement formation context. The mechanism is straightforward. 
A group of players individually decide whether or not to join an agreement, in which 
members to the agreement commit to contributing to the public good. Upon joining the 
agreement, each member is required to pay a deposit to a neutral, third-party institution. 
The agreement enters into force if enough players join (and pay deposits) to satisfy a 
minimum membership requirement.9 If the membership requirement is not satisfied, 
then no deposits are paid and no agreement enters into force. If the membership 
requirement is satisfied, then the agreement enters into force and members then decide 
whether or not to comply with their commitments (i.e., whether to contribute to the public 
good). After these decisions are made, the third-party institution pays back the deposit if 
the member is found compliant. Otherwise, the noncompliant agreement member is not 
refunded their deposit. The deposit-refund scheme does not require strong institutions 
in the sense that the neutral third party cannot force members to contribute (e.g. 
through taxation) and cannot engage in ex post sanctioning (e.g., issuing fines in 
response to noncompliance). Rather, the neutral institution simply has to withhold the 
initial deposit. 
 
In our setting the deposit-refund mechanism can be likened to performance bonds that 
are levied in order to ensure fulfillment of environmental obligations. An example is the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (1977) which requires firms to purchase 
bonds before attaining the permits to begin a mining project. The bond amounts are 
refunded if the mined land is adequately reclaimed. Performance bonds are also used in 
the management of timber, oil and gas industries. While deposit-refunds/performance 
bonds, to our knowledge, have not been included as compliance provisions in 
environmental agreements, the fact that similar mechanisms are used in other 
environmental policy dimensions suggests that such mechanisms may be effective. 
 
Our experimental design consists of three treatments. The first is a simple voluntary 
contributions game which is used as our baseline. The baseline captures the unilateral 
management of shared environmental and natural resources within social dilemma 
situations. The second treatment is an agreement formation game with a deposit-refund 
mechanism that requires full participation. In this treatment all players need to join the 
agreement before it enters into force. If full participation is not achieved, deposits are 
returned and players revert to the same voluntary contributions game as in the baseline 
treatment. The third and final treatment is an agreement formation game with a deposit-
refund mechanism that only requires partial participation before entry into force. This 
treatment is motivated by many international agreements that require less than full 
participation, most notably the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
We find that when full participation is required under a deposit-refund mechanism, the 
agreement formation process is almost 100 percent efficient. Agreements enter into 
force in nearly every trial and compliance is full. This is a dramatic increase in efficiency 
compared to the baseline case (i.e., the unilateral management case). Specifically, we 
observe a 33 percentage point increase in efficiency under voluntary agreements with a 
deposit-refund scheme that require full participation compared to unilateral 
management. Interestingly, agreements with deposit refunds that require only partial 
participation do not improve upon the unilateral management situation. Agreements 
formed infrequently in this scenario, but when agreements did form, average 
contributions were higher compared to those under unilateral management. 
Surprisingly, when agreements failed to form, contributions were dramatically lower than 
under the baseline treatment (26 vs. 60% efficiency). This suggests that behavior in the 
first stage affects cooperative behavior in the second stage. Players contributed far less 
to the public good when an agreement failed compared to when there was no option for 
an agreement to form. 
 
Our research is also related to the extensive literature on threshold public good 
experiments with money-back guarantees (Van de Kragt et al. 1983; Dawes et al. 1986; 
Isaac et al. 1989; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989; Erev and Rapoport 1990; Bagnoli 
and McKee 1991; Suleiman and Rapoport 1992; Rapoport and Suleiman 1993; Marks 
and Croson 1998, 1999; Cadsby and Maynes 1999; McEvoy 2010; Rauchdobler et al. 
2010). In these experiments, subjects make individual contribution decisions, and if the 
threshold level of contributions (or contributors) is satisfied, then the public good is 
provided. Otherwise, contributions are returned. The threshold, like the minimum 
participation requirement in our experiments, acts as a commitment device. Our 
experiment differs in an important way from these experiments by giving subjects the 
opportunity to violate their commitments in a second stage. 
 
 
 
 
2 Experimental Design 
 
Our baseline treatment is a familiar discrete choice public goods game. Players are in 
groups of five. Each subject is endowed with $13 and she must decide whether or not to 
contribute $8 from her endowment to a public account.13 Every $1 contributed to the 
public account returns $0.50 to each person in the group (i.e., the marginal per-capita 
return is 0.5). Players make their contribution decisions simultaneously. Therefore, a 
player’s payoff function is 
 
(1)     
 
where qi equals one if player i contributes $8 to the public account and zero if player I 
contributes zero, and q−i is the sum of the binary contribution decisions by the other four 
players. In a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, no contributions are made to the public 
account. This is confirmed by subtracting a player’s payoff when contributing zero to the 
public good from their payoff when they contribute $8, πi (qi = 0) − πi (qi = 1) = $ − 4. 
However, achieving the social optimum requires that all five players in the group 
contribute $8 to the public account. In this case all players earn $25. 
 
In contrast to the theoretical prediction of no contributions, years of experimental 
research informs us that some subjects are expected to contribute to public goods in 
social dilemma situations such as this. A common result in a repeated game setting is 
that contributions start in the range of 40–60 percent of the maximum and decrease as 
the experiment progresses (Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). 
 
In our second treatment, full participation, we give subjects the opportunity to form an 
agreement with the goal of increasing contributions to the public good. The agreement 
works as follows: In the first stage, subjects decide simultaneously whether to join an 
agreement. An agreement is said to form if and only if all five players join. When an 
agreement does form, its members enter a non-binding commitment to contribute $8 to 
the public account. In addition, joining an agreement requires that players pay an 
upfront deposit of d as part of the membership process. If an agreement forms after the 
first-stage decisions are made, then in the second stage its members decide individually 
whether to comply with their commitment and contribute $8 to the public account. If a 
member does contribute $8 to the public account in the second stage (i.e., she 
complies) then she is refunded her deposit of d. Otherwise, if she does not contribute $8 
she is not refunded her deposit. Finally, if at least one player fails to join the agreement 
in the first stage then no agreement forms. In this case, all deposits are instantly 
refunded to those players that joined the agreement and all players revert back to the 
baseline game in stage two. 
 
Therefore, if an agreement forms in the first stage of the game, individuals face the 
following payoff functions during stage two 
(2)     
 
where the superscripts c and nc indicate compliance and noncompliance by members 
to an agreement, respectively. Recall, that if at least one player does not join, then no 
agreement forms and all players face the same payoff function in [1] during stage two. 
With this agreement mechanism, members earn higher payoffs complying provided that 
d > 4. Indeed, as long as d > 4 the efficient solution can be implemented as part of a 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium; meaning, all five players join the agreement in the 
first stage and then contribute $8 to the public account in the second stage. We set the 
deposit amount at $5 for our experiments. The solution is straightforward and is found 
using backward induction. While in the second stage, there are two possible scenarios 
that players may face. Consider first the scenario in which no agreement forms in the 
first stage. In this case the game-theoretic prediction, like the baseline game, is that no 
player contributes to the public account and each player earns $13. The other possible 
scenario in stage two is that an agreement has formed at the end of stage one. In this 
case each member decides between complying with the agreement and contributing 
their $8 or not complying and keeping their $8. A comparison of the payoff functions in 
equation [2] illustrates that in this subgame all agreement members are expected to 
comply with their commitments. When compliance is full the value of the public account 
is $20, and since each player is refunded their $5 deposit they earn $25. Given the 
expected earnings in stage two, joining the agreement in stage one is a weakly 
dominant strategy for each player. 
 
Our third and final treatment, partial participation, examines the deposit-refund 
mechanism when full participation is not required. This treatment proceeds like the 
second  
 
Table 1 Expected Earnings for agreement members and nonmembers 
 
 
treatment, but now an agreement will form if at least three players join in stage one. 
Therefore, when agreements form, they can range from having three, four or five 
members. This means that in cases in which participation is less than full, members and 
nonmembers can coexist. Members, as before, commit to contributing $8 to the public 
account and must pay an initial deposit of $5. Nonmembers, in contrast, do not commit 
to contributing $8 and also do not pay the $5 deposit. Rather, nonmembers simply play 
the baseline game. 
 
We again solve the game using backward induction. When an agreement fails to form, 
as in this second treatment, players are expected to earn $13. On the other hand, from 
the comparison of the payoff functions in equation [2] and a deposit amount of $5, when 
agreements do form we expect members to comply with their commitments and 
contribute $8 to the public account (the cost of noncompliance ($5) is greater than the 
benefit ($4)). Nonmembers, if they exist, are expected not to contribute the public 
account and earn $13 plus the value of the public account. Therefore, nonmembers will 
earn strictly more than members ($8 more) and hence there is a financial incentive to 
not join the agreement and to free ride on the contributions to the public account. Table 
1 shows the expected earnings for members and nonmembers given the three possible 
agreement sizes. 
 
A comparison of the payoffs from Table 1 illustrates that while nonmembers always 
earn more than agreement members, all players are better off when an agreement 
forms compared to having no agreement at all (recall, players expect to earn $13 when 
an agreement does not form). Hence players have two conflicting incentives; on one 
hand the incentive to free ride encourages nonparticipation, and on the other hand the 
incentive to ensure an agreement forms encourages participation. This tension allows 
for two subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in this game. An equilibrium exists in which no 
agreement forms (less than three players join in the first stage) and no contributions are 
made to the public account in the second stage. In addition, an agreement of size three 
can exist in equilibrium in which the members fully comply with their commitments and 
contribute to the public good.17 In short, we expect this third treatment to be weakly 
more efficient than the baseline treatment and less efficient than the full participation 
treatment. 
 
Participants were recruited from the general student body at Appalachian State 
University. For each of the three treatments, we conducted a session with 15 subjects. 
The subjects were placed in groups of five and the groups were reshuffled for each of 
10 rounds. For each session, all of the rules and parameters remained constant over 
the ten rounds. Subjects were informed that they would only be paid for one round of 
play and that round would be chosen at random after all of the rounds were completed. 
To mitigate end-game effects, the subjects were not told the exact number of rounds. 
The experiments were hand run and lasted roughly one hour for the baseline treatment 
and 1.5 h for the deposit-refund treatments. The experiment yielded 450 individual-level 
observations, 150 for each treatment. 
 
In the baseline treatment, subjects were provided with a contribution decision sheet at 
the start of each round that contained a table displaying all of their earnings possibilities 
as well as check boxes that subjects used to indicate their decisions. Subjects had to 
check whether or not to contribute $8 to the public account. After all subjects in the 
room were finished making their decisions, the sheets were collected and the 
contributions were tallied. At that point the results for the round were recorded onto the 
subjects’ decisions sheets and handed back. At the end of each round subjects were 
informed (via their decision sheet) of how many players in their group contributed $8 to 
the public account and their individual earnings. Subjects were also provided with a 
record sheet on which they recorded the results for each round of play. 
 
In the other two treatments, the contribution decision was preceded by an agreement 
decision. An agreement decision sheet was used by subjects to indicate their decision 
whether or not to join the agreement. This sheet also contained tables that displayed all 
of their earnings possibilities. After all of the participants made their agreement decision, 
the sheets were collected, the decisions were tabulated and the results were recorded 
on the individual decision sheets. The sheets were then returned to the subjects. At that 
point each subject was informed of how many subjects joined the agreement, whether 
or not it formed and whether or not a deposit of $5 was deducted. Then subjects moved 
to the contribution decision, as described in the baseline. Using the contribution 
decision sheet, subjects indicated whether or not they contribute $8 to the public 
account. Once subjects were finished making their contribution decisions, the sheets 
were collected, the results tabulated and recorded. Subjects were then informed of how 
many group members contributed to the public account, whether their deposit was 
returned and their earnings for the round. Subjects recorded their round earnings on 
their record sheet and the next round began. 
 
3 Results 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of players that contributed to the public good by 
treatment and round. Numbers from the baseline setting initially reveal the familiar 
pattern of positive, though less than socially optimal, contributions that decay over time 
(Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011), but in later rounds, contributions exhibit a more stable 
pattern that is often observed in the closely related threshold public good setting (e.g., 
Croson and Marks 2000). Initially, 73 percent of players contribute, but the number falls 
to about 50 percent during the session and ends at 60 percent in the final rounds. Table 
2 summarizes the contribution levels across all rounds for each treatment. The average 
contribution level in the baseline treatment was 60 percent. 
 
Result 1 A deposit-refund mechanism that requires full participation leads to nearly 
efficient public-good provision. 
 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, 97.3 percent of subjects (146/150) chose to join 
the agreement, which led to agreements forming in 90 percent of trials (27/30). As 
shown in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Percentage contributing by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Percentage contributing by treatment over rounds 
 
Fig. 1, the decision to join is universal (100%) in seven of the ten rounds, and such 
cooperation is sustained over the final five rounds. Moreover, when agreements formed 
subjects were perfectly compliant with their commitment to contribute to the public good. 
The combination of a high percentage of agreement formation and perfect compliance 
lead to an overall contribution level of 93.3 percent (Table 2). Therefore we find support 
for the theoretical prediction from section two, and from Gerber and Wichardt (2009), 
that a deposit-refund mechanism that requires full participation will lead to efficient 
public-good provision. 
 
Result 2 A deposit-refund mechanism that requires only partial participation does not 
improve upon average baseline public-good contribution levels. 
 
When only partial participation was required, 54.7 percent of subjects (82/150) joined 
the agreement with agreements forming in only 53.3 percent of trials (16/30).19 Overall, 
55.3 percent of subjects (83/150) contributed to the public good (Table 2), which is 
statistically equivalent to contributions in the baseline setting (55.3 vs. 60.0%, p = 
0.414).20 When agreements did form, they had an average of 3.69 members (out of 
five). These summary results indicate that the incentive to free ride in the partial 
participation setting caused low  
 
Table 3 Percentage contributing by treatment and membership decision 
 
 
levels of agreement formation, and less than full participation when agreements did 
form. However, the deposit-refund scenario that requires only partial participation was 
effective at achieving nearly full compliance from its members (98.3 percent). This 
implies that the deposit-refund mechanism, in both the partial and full participation 
cases, effectively facilitates contributions from the members when an agreement forms. 
 
We examine the data in more detail by stratifying contribution decisions by whether the 
agreement formed and whether group members signed up to join the agreement. The 
numbers, as reported in Table 3, reveal key elements behind the overall performance 
measures of the deposit-refund mechanisms. 
 
Result 3 When agreements form, a deposit-refund mechanism that requires only partial 
participation causes an increase in contributions relative to the baseline. 
 
Considering only the partial participation case, we see from Table 3 that contribution 
levels when an agreement formed were more than double the levels observed when an 
agreement does not form; 76.3 vs. 31.4 percent. A comparison of the contribution rates 
under the deposit-refund mechanism when agreements formed and the baseline case 
shows a significant increase in public-good provision (76.3 vs. 60.0%, p = 0.014). When 
agreements form, most of the public-good contributions are provided by members; 98.3 
percent of members contribute and 14.3 percent of nonmembers contribute. Note 
further that the percentage of nonmembers contributing in this scenario is significantly 
lower than the percentage of contributors in the baseline (14.3 vs. 60.0%, p = 0.000). 
Therefore free-riding is exacerbated among nonmembers when partial agreements 
form. 
 
Result 4 When agreements fail to form, deposit-refund mechanisms cause a decrease 
in public-good contributions relative to the baseline. 
 
An interesting finding is the stark difference in behavior when agreements failed to form 
and the baseline. Recall, if an agreement does not form, the group and its members 
remain in the baseline public-good setting. Thus, at the time of the contribution decision, 
the only difference between the deposit-refund treatments and the baseline is a 
previously failed attempt to form an agreement. The data suggest that this failure 
matters a great deal. In the baseline treatment, 60.0 percent of members contributed to 
the public good, which is nearly twice the levels 
 
Table 4 Probit models: determinants of contribution decision 
 
 
observed in the full and partial participation treatments (33.3 and 31.4 %, respectively). 
It appears the failure of forming an agreement can undermine cooperation. 
We confirm these results with a conditional analysis by estimating a series of probit 
models of individual contribution decisions. In each model, the dependent variable is the 
subject’s decision to contribute to the public good (1 if contribute; 0 otherwise). 
Estimates control for period-specific fixed-effects and take into account that individual 
subjects make repeated decisions by employing robust standard errors and clustering at 
the individual level. The results are reported in Table 4. We begin with a basic model in 
which the dependent variable is estimated as a function of the two deposit-refund 
treatments (omitting the baseline). The results are consistent with our initial findings; 
that is, a deposit-refund scheme that requires full participation increases a subject’s 
likelihood of contributing to the public good relative to the baseline (marginal effect = 
0.333), while contributions are not significantly different with a partial participation 
scheme. 
 
The second model adds an additional independent variable that interacts the presence 
of a deposit-refund mechanism (full or partial) with the failure of an agreement forming. 
The estimate for the interaction variable indicates how the failure to form an agreement 
influences the likelihood of contributing to the public good, while controlling for individual 
treatment effects. Results reveal a negative and highly significant relationship (marginal 
effect = −0.566), indicating that subjects are less likely to contribute to the public good 
after a failed attempt to form an agreement, as compared to the absence of any 
opportunity to form an agreement. This indicates that while successful agreement 
formation significantly improves cooperation, an unsuccessful effort might lead to worse 
outcomes in comparison to not pursuing an agreement. The final model adds an 
interaction variable to isolate players that do not join a partial agreement to disentangle 
the effect of a successfully formed partial agreement on members and nonmembers. 
Estimates show that the new interaction term is significant and negative (marginal effect 
= −0.878) while the previously insignificant coefficient for the partial participation term is 
now significant and positive (marginal effect = 0.364). Results show the formation of a 
partial agreement leads to greater contributions from members while also exacerbating 
free-riding from nonmembers. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Without a global governmental system that can provide direct regulation of resource 
use, countries are left to manage shared resources voluntarily through environmental 
agreements. While a decent amount of research has focused on the challenge of 
getting nations to voluntarily participate in these agreements, very little research has 
examined the problem of maintaining compliance with the commitments of the 
members. This paper uses lab experiments to evaluate the performance of one 
promising mechanism—a deposit-refund mechanism—in which players pay a deposit 
upon joining an agreement and are later refunded the deposit if they are not in violation 
of their commitments. Our results provide an empirical test of the deposit-refund 
mechanism recently proposed by Gerber and Wichardt 2009, but adapted here within 
an agreement formation game to provide a public good. 
 
Our results show that the deposit-refund mechanism has differential impacts, depending 
on whether full or partial participation is required. When the participation of all players is 
required before an agreement enters into force, the mechanism achieves near-perfect 
efficiency levels. That is, agreements form in almost every trial and members are 
perfectly compliant when agreements do form (all deposits are refunded). The result 
confirms the encouraging theoretical prediction of Gerber and Wichardt (2009) that the 
deposit-refund mechanism will achieve significant efficiency gains relative to a voluntary 
contribution mechanism. However, our research explores an important variation of the 
deposit-refund system not analyzed by Gerber andWichardt. That is, we show that 
when less than full participation is required for an agreement to enter into force—the 
situation that characterizes most global environmental agreements (e.g., Kyoto 
Protocol)—the deposit-refund mechanism does not increase average efficiency 
measures. Agreements form only about half of the time. When agreements do form, the 
deposit-refund mechanism is successful at motivating full compliance of its members 
and therefore a subset of the players act more cooperatively relative to the baseline 
case. At the same time, however, a deposit-refund mechanism that requires only partial 
participation exacerbates free-riding behavior in two important ways. First, when 
agreements form the nonmembers are less cooperative compared to players in the 
absence of such a mechanism. Second, when agreements fail to form players act 
significantly less cooperative than when they had no opportunity to join an agreement. 
Therefore it appears that a previously failed attempt at forming an agreement can 
undermine cooperation. 
 
Our experiments, like the model proposed by Gerber and Wichardt, necessarily abstract 
from many of the practical implications of implementing a deposit-refund system within 
an international environmental agreement. However, the basic mechanism is simple 
and its most critical element is that parties empower a neutral third-party institution with 
the power to withhold financial deposits in cases of noncompliance. The financial 
institution would serve as an escrow account in which monies will be disbursed given 
the fulfillment of contractual emissions abatement responsibilities. Since third-party 
financial institutions have been implemented within other IEAs (e.g., Multilateral Fund 
under the Montreal Protocol), this challenge appears to be achievable. In the model we 
test, players face predefined emissions abatement commitments, deposit amounts and 
a minimum number of countries required to ratify for entry into force. Apart from paying 
deposits, stage one in our experiments can be likened to Annex I countries deciding 
whether to ratify the Kyoto Protocol given defined emissions limits (relative to their 1990 
levels) and a minimum participation constraint (at least 55 of the parties needed to 
ratify). 
 
In our experiments, players have identical payoff functions. In reality, countries involved 
in IEAs typically have differential commitments as members, andmost importantly, 
different incentives to violate those commitments. Since the up-front deposit paid by 
each member must weakly exceed the financial incentive to cheat, heterogeneous 
members should also face different deposit amounts. To provide a rough idea of the 
size of these deposits, a report by the Energy Information Administration (1998) 
compiled cost estimates for the United States to comply with the Kyoto Protocol (a 
seven percent reduction in 1990 level emissions) that ranged from $52 billion to $437 
billion (0.5–4.2% of 2010 GDP). Clearly, deposit amounts for large greenhouse-gas 
emitting nations are non-trivial. Moreover, uncertainty in the benefit/cost functions or the 
realities of incomplete (or inaccurate monitoring) will likely play an important role in 
determining optimal deposit sizes. 
 
Our overarching results suggest that a deposit-refund mechanism can be very effective 
when agreements require full participation, but is less effective, and potentially 
disruptive, when agreements require only partial participation. While these results help 
inform the design of effective institution formation, there are some obvious extensions 
that should be carried out to explore other relevant issues. As highlighted previously, a 
useful extension would be to introduce heterogeneity into the players’ payoff functions 
and commitment levels, which would translate into requiring differential deposit 
amounts. While this is likely not a problem theoretically, it is unclear how this will impact 
the effectiveness of the mechanism. If parties exhibit other-regarding preferences (like 
inequality aversion), which is sometimes demonstrated to be the case (Charness and 
Rabin 2002), having differential commitments and deposits could undermine the 
positive features of the mechanism. Other useful extensions include introducing 
uncertainty by making the benefits of cooperation uncertain and/or by relaxing the 
assumption of perfect and complete monitoring for compliance. 
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